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Third Party Access to Infrastructure in the United 
States 
Jana L. Grauberger 
Joshua P. Downer 
INTRODUCTION 
Offshore oil production in the Gulf of Mexico began in 1938 with the 
construction of a platform located one and a half miles from the shore in 
fourteen feet of water.1 That platform, located off the coast of Cameron, 
Louisiana, in an area dubbed the Creole field, produced an estimated four 
million barrels of oil in the first twenty-five years. Oil was shipped to shore 
via a small diameter pipeline. The greatest access challenge was the 
lengthy, and sometimes difficult, daily commute of workers to and from 
the platform on shrimp boats already tasked with carrying supplies and 
equipment for the platform’s operation. 
Fast-forward almost eight decades to the present, and approximately 
6,000 active federal leases span thirty-two million acres on the Outer 
Continental Shelf (OCS).2 In 2014, the OCS accounted for eighteen percent 
of oil production and five percent of natural gas production in the United 
States. The vast majority of OCS production comes from deepwater leases.3 
Unlike other mature production areas in the United Kingdom and Norway, 
the Gulf of Mexico still promises large future discoveries.4 
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 1. Joseph A. Pratt, Offshore at 60: Remembering the Creole field, Offshore 
Magazine (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-
74/issue-4/60-years-of-offshore/offshore-at-60-remembering-the-creole-field-p1 
.html, archived at [perma.cc/6MBA-KPFN]. 
 2. Enerknol Research, Gulf of Mexico Poised for Oil and Gas Production 
Growth, Breaking Energy (Mar. 23, 2015), http://breakingenergy.com/2015 
/03/23/gulf-of-mexico-poised-for-oil-and-gas-production-growth/ [perma.cc  
/WR43-D2X9]. 
 3. See Deepwater Production Summary by Year, Bureau of Safety and Envtl 
Enforcement, http://www.data.bsee.gov/homepg/data_center/production 
/production/summary.asp [perma.cc/W9BD-J7ZB] (last visited Aug. 23, 2015). 
“Deepwater” refers to water depths extending beyond 1,000 feet. 
 4. “[T]here could be as much as three to four times more oil—potentially 48 
billion barrels of undiscovered oil are believed to be in the Gulf of Mexico, compared 
to just 13 billion onshore.” Nick Cunningham, Big Oil Going Big in the Gulf of 
Mexico, OilPrice.Com (Nov. 27, 2014), http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Big-
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Yet for deepwater and ultra-deepwater5 prospects, significant challenges 
impede economical production of discovered reserves, including the 
extremely high costs associated with operating deepwater production facilities 
and pipelines and the limited or nonexistent production and pipeline 
infrastructure in certain OCS areas. Subsea tiebacks of production from 
multiple prospects to a single production facility and export pipeline system 
are often the only economical option, and tiebacks may require access to 
facilities owned by someone else.6 While there is no shortage of infrastructure 
in shallow water, competing interests drive the prompt decommissioning of 
older pipelines and facilities and the preservation of those structures for 
prospective third-party use. That tension has been resolved in favor of 
decommissioning in the absence of an immediate third-party need and 
bargained-for private agreement. 
With this backdrop in mind, this article explores the landscape of 
obtaining access to existing third-party offshore infrastructure in the 
United States. Part I outlines the statutory and regulatory authorities 
governing access to Gulf pipelines. Part II contrasts pipeline regulation 
with third-party access to other various structures on the OCS, such as 
platforms, concluding that a vast area of OCS development and production 
goes unregulated as to third party access, necessitating private contractual 
agreements to fill the void. Part III addresses deepwater ports, which are 
an exception to this general rule and do impose common carrier access 
requirements. 
I.  PIPELINES—PRIMARILY FEDERAL STATUTES 
When it comes to regulating third party access to active infrastructure, 
the amount of regulation differs significantly between pipelines and 
associated facilities and all other structures on the OCS. No fewer than 
three federal statutes govern the movement of oil and gas through OCS 
pipelines: the Natural Gas Act (NGA),7 the Interstate Commerce Act 
                                                                                                             
Oil-Going-Big-in-the-Gulf-of-Mexico.html [perma.cc/XE2N-JYEE]; See also 
Reserves Inventory Program - Gulf of Mexico OCS Region, Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Mgmt., http://www.boem.gov/2013-GOMR-Reserves-History/ [perma.cc/AX2X-
4TRD] (last visited Aug. 25, 2015) (The following fields are examples of relatively 
recent Gulf of Mexico discoveries of significant reserves: DC004 (2010) 24.6 
MMBOE; KC875 (2010) 112.6 MMBOE; KC964 (2008) 80.3 MMBOE; WR759 
(2004) 76.9 MMBOE; WR678 (2003) 92.9 MMBOE; WR508 (2005) 44.9 MMBOE; 
WR029 (2005) 89.2 MMBOE). 
 5. Ultra-deepwater refers to water depths greater than 5,000 feet. 
 6. An estimated fifty percent of projects scheduled to come online in 2015 
and 2016 involve subsea tiebacks. Enerknol Research, supra note 3. 
 7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17z (2014). 
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(ICA),8 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).9 While the 
first two apply to pipelines both on and off the OCS, all three contain 
provisions affecting third party access to pipelines. The precise 
mechanisms, standards, and covered facilities, however, differ from 
statute to statute. 
A. Gas Pipelines—The Natural Gas Act 
Enacted at roughly the same time that the first Gulf of Mexico platforms 
were popping up in the Creole field, the NGA was part of Congress’s response 
to the perceived pipeline monopolies that arose in the United States during the 
onshore oil boom of the 1920s. Originally administered by the Federal Power 
Commission, the NGA now vests in the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) the authority to regulate a wide range of activities 
associated with the interstate transportation of natural gas by pipeline. 
At its core, the NGA governs the transportation of natural gas in interstate 
commerce, the sale of natural gas “for resale,” and the “natural-gas 
companies” involved in these processes.10 The statute defines “interstate 
commerce” broadly to include transportation between a state or United States 
territory and “any point outside thereof,” thus, encompassing many pipelines 
that ship from the OCS to shore within its jurisdictional reach.11 
The NGA touches on almost all aspects of a jurisdictional natural gas 
company’s business, from commencement of service to abandonment of 
the pipeline. The Act requires pipeline companies to acquire a certificate 
of public convenience and necessity from FERC prior to beginning 
service, and the company must demonstrate that the proposed facility or 
service will serve the public interest.12 Similarly, a jurisdictional pipeline 
cannot abandon any facilities or discontinue any service without approval 
from FERC following a determination by FERC that such abandonment 
will not impair the public interest.13 
The NGA’s focus on the public interest also manifests in provisions 
designed to promote competition and open access for all shippers. For 
example, the statute requires that natural gas companies charge only “just and 
reasonable” rates.14 The NGA further prohibits any “undue preferences” or 
                                                                                                             
 8. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 10101-16106 (1988). 
 9. 43 U.S.C. § 1331-1356b (2014). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b). “Natural-gas companies” are defined as “a person 
engaged in the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, or the sale in 
interstate commerce of such gas for resale.” Id. § 717a(6). 
 11. See id. § 717a(7). 
 12. See id. § 717f(c)(1). 
 13. Id. § 717f(b). 
 14. Id. § 717c(a). 
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any “unreasonable difference” between services offered in different localities 
or to different classes of shippers.15 FERC’s regulations expand on these 
requirements to bar undue discrimination or preferences as to rates, volumes 
to be transported, or the quality or duration of service offered.16 
FERC employs a two-part test to determine whether rates or practices 
are unduly discriminatory, which considers (1) whether two classes of 
customers are treated differently, and (2) whether the two classes of 
customers are similarly situated.17 To constitute undue discrimination, 
disparate treatment must be substantial and without a reasonable basis (i.e., 
differences in economic treatment, quality of service, or pipeline or gas 
usage).18  A mere discrepancy in rates, standing alone, is not enough to 
amount to undue discrimination under the NGA.19 
In practice, the rate and service requirements of the NGA are primarily 
administered through a tariff system. A jurisdictional facility will have a 
tariff on file and in effect with FERC detailing the different rates and 
service terms.20 Any changes in the rates, forms of service agreements, or 
the general terms and conditions of service will typically require a separate 
filing, notice to the public, and approval by FERC.21 
FERC has a broad range of tools at its disposal to remedy and prevent 
undue discrimination and ensure open access for shippers, including the 
authority to force a jurisdictional pipeline to provide service in certain 
circumstances. FERC has also established a policy of requiring pipelines to 
allow a shipper to interconnect with their facilities under certain conditions. 
Interconnects may be mandated when: (1) the party seeking the interconnect 
is willing to pay the costs of construction, (2) the interconnect does not 
“adversely affect” the pipeline’s operations, (3) the interconnect would not 
“diminish service” to existing customers, (4) the interconnect would not 
violate any other laws or regulations, and (5) the interconnect would not 
violate the pipeline’s right-of-way agreements or other contractual obligations 
with respect to the interconnection facilities.22 If these five conditions are met, 
an interstate natural gas pipeline may have no choice but to allow an 
interconnect and provide transportation. However, FERC does not have the 
                                                                                                             
 15. Id. § 717c(b). 
 16. See 18 C.F.R. § 284.7(b) (2015). 
 17. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 120 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,086, at 61,585 (2007). 
 18. See ANR Pipeline Co. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 91 
F.E.R.C. 61,066 (2000); PG&E Transmission, 82 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,289 (1998). 
 19. Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm’n, 373 U.S. 294, 302 (1963). 
 20. 18 C.F.R. § 154.1 (2015). See also id. § 284.303 (providing blanket 
transportation certificates for OCS pipelines subject to NGA jurisdiction). 
 21. See id. § 154.204. 
 22. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 91 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,037, at 61,141 (2000). 
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power to order a natural gas pipeline to expand its facilities due to prohibitions 
in other sections of the NGA.23 
While access to many natural gas transportation lines on the OCS will 
be regulated by FERC under the NGA, the Act’s reach is somewhat limited 
by its gathering facilities exception. The NGA only applies to “natural-gas 
companies,” meaning companies engaged in transporting gas in interstate 
commerce.24 Further, “the production or gathering of natural gas” is 
specifically excluded from FERC’s jurisdiction under the NGA.25 While 
the statute does not define these terms, courts have applied a common 
sense meaning, ruling that “production” and “gathering” refer to the 
“physical acts of drawing the gas from the earth and preparing it for the 
first stages of distribution.”26 Therefore, for the purposes of the NGA, 
gathering refers to the process of moving gas from multiple production 
facilities to a central collection point for further transportation down a 
transmission system.27 When discussing the reach of the NGA offshore, 
determining where this process ends and where transportation begins often 
becomes a critical inquiry. 
FERC uses a “modified primary function” test to determine whether a 
facility is engaged in the gathering of natural gas and thus beyond the 
scope of FERC’s NGA jurisdiction and the associated open access 
requirements.28 This test examines physical and non-physical criteria of 
the facility, with the non-physical considered secondary to the physical.29 
The physical criteria include: the length and diameter of the pipeline, 
whether the facility extends beyond the central point in the relevant field, 
the geographic configuration, the location of compression and processing 
plants, the location of wells along part or all of the facility, the operating 
pressure of the line, and whether the facilities are located behind a 
processing plant.30 The non-physical criteria include: the intended 
purpose, location and operation of the facility, the general business activity 
                                                                                                             
 23. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2014). 
 24. Id. § 717a(6). 
 25. Id. § 717(b). 
 26. N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 90-91 (1963). 
 27. See Nw. Pipeline Corp. v. FERC, 905 F.2d 1403, 1404 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 28. See, e.g.¸ Amerada Hess Corp., 52 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,268, at 62,001 (1990); 
Farmland Industries Inc., 23 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,063, at 61,063 (1983). 
 29. See EXCO Res. Inc., TGG Pipeline, Ltd., 119 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,121, at 61,805 
(2007) (citing Sea Robin Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 127 F.3d 365, 271 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 30. FERC has noted, however, that the location of the processing plant is of 
limited utility when discussing offshore facilities. See Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 87 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,384, at 62,432 (1999), reh’g denied, 92 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,072 (2000). 
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of the owner of the facility, and whether jurisdictional determination is 
consistent with objectives of the NGA and the Natural Gas Policy Act.31 
In the offshore context, FERC has indicated that if a pipeline system 
contains a facility where gas is delivered by several smaller lines for 
aggregation and transportation through a singular larger line, the location 
of that central facility will carry “considerable weight” in application of 
the modified primary function test; the central facility will generally serve 
as the dividing line between non-jurisdictional gathering and jurisdictional 
transportation.32 In addition, natural gas facilities located in water depths 
of 200 meters or more are presumed to be gathering facilities up to the 
point of potential connection with the interstate pipeline grid.33 After the 
application of all these factors, pipeline facilities upstream of the line are 
generally considered gathering facilities outside of FERC’s regulatory 
purview under the NGA. 
Even if a facility primarily serves a gathering function, that fact may 
not, in every instance, be enough to remove it from FERC’s NGA 
jurisdiction. While the NGA does not grant FERC the authority to regulate 
gathering facilities, FERC has interpreted the NGA as permitting it to 
regulate gathering by jurisdictional “natural-gas companies” that occurs 
“in connection with” interstate transportation service. Thus, FERC has 
historically regulated the natural gas gathering services offered by the 
interstate pipelines that otherwise fall under its NGA jurisdiction.34 
For this and other reasons, many pipeline companies have increasingly 
sought to transfer their offshore gathering facilities to companies 
specializing in offshore systems.35 Frequently, this goal is accomplished 
by either “spinning down” or “spinning off” the portion of the pipeline’s 
system that would qualify as a gathering facility under the modified 
primary function test. A “spin off” is the transfer of a gathering facility to 
                                                                                                             
 31. S. Natural Gas Co., L.L.C. v. Amp Gathering I, LP, 150 F.E.R.C. ¶ 
61,196, at 62,329 (2015). 
 32. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 87 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,384, at 62,427. 
 33. See Statement of Policy, Gas Pipeline Facilities and Services on the Outer 
Continental Shelf - Issues Related to the Commission's Jurisdiction Under the 
Natural Gas Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 74 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,222, 
at 61,753 (1996). 
 34. BP America Inc., 147 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,130, at 61804 (2014). 
 35. In addition to this regulatory incentive, there are often economic reasons 
for a company with significant onshore assets to abandon its offshore systems. 
Many companies simply view offshore facilities as more risky and expensive than 
their onshore counterparts. The separation of offshore gathering facilities from 
larger transportation systems is also driven by the national trend of unbundling 
services, as pipeline companies have moved from a primarily merchant to a 
transporter role.  See Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations 
Governing Self-Implementing Transportation; and Regulation of Natural Gas 
Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (April 16, 1992). 
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an unrelated entity, while a “spin down” is the transfer of a facility to a 
subsidiary or affiliate. To accomplish a spin down, the jurisdictional 
pipeline company seeks to abandon its facility to the affiliate by 
petitioning FERC, and the affiliate simultaneously petitions FERC for an 
order declaring that the facility will no longer be subject to FERC 
jurisdiction after the abandonment.36 FERC has generally allowed spin 
downs and spin offs despite the concerns of natural gas shippers that the 
lack of NGA regulation will expose them to discriminatory rates and 
monopolistic practices.37 However, FERC has cautioned that it will 
attempt to reassert NGA jurisdiction over facilities owned by a gathering 
affiliate under certain conditions.38 
B. Oil And Liquids Pipelines—The Interstate Commerce Act 
Congress has also charged FERC with regulating interstate oil 
pipelines under the ICA, a statute with a unique and complex regulatory 
history.39 The relevant statutory text underlying FERC’s power in this area 
does not exist in any federal reporter. Instead, one must look to the statute 
as it existed on October 1, 1977. Originally governing activities such as 
transportation by railroads and telegraph companies, the ICA was 
amended to include transportation of oil through pipeline in 1906, as 
                                                                                                             
 36. David V. Bryce, Pipeline Gathering in an Unbundled World: How FERC’s 
Response to ‘Spin Down’ Threatens Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 89 
Minn. L. Rev. 537, 552 (Dec. 2004). 
 37. See, e.g., Trunkline Gas Co., LLC; Sea Robin Pipeline Co., LLC, 139 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,239 (2012) (reviewing a Trunkline Gas application to abandon all 
of its offshore facilities to an affiliate and noting sua sponte that some of the 
facilities performed a gathering function and would not be subject to FERC’s 
jurisdiction under the NGA after the transfer to the affiliate); Mid Louisiana Gas 
Co., 67 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255, at 61,851 (1994), order on reh’g, 69 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,303 
(1994) (finding that despite the fact that many customers are “captive to a single 
gatherer” and that there was often “no competition for gathering services,” FERC 
could not simply choose to regulate gathering not performed by an interstate 
natural gas company in connection with a jurisdictional service). 
 38. Arkla Gathering Service Co., 67 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,257 (1994), order on reh’g, 
69 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,280, reh’g denied, 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,079 (1995), reconsideration 
denied, 71 FERC ¶ 61,297 (1995), aff’d in part and reversed in part, Conoco Inc. v. 
FERC, 90 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Criteria for Reassertion of Jurisdiction Over the 
Gathering Services of Natural Gas Company Affiliates, 118 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,114 (2007). 
 39. While this paper refers to FERC’s regulation of “pipelines” under the 
ICA, jurisdiction under the ICA is individual-shipment-based. The same pipeline 
may provide both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional transportation through the 
same segment, depending on the shipper’s intent and whether the individual 
shipment moves in interstate commerce. 
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America’s oil industry began to bloom.40 In 1977, regulatory responsibility 
for interstate oil pipelines was transferred from the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) to FERC. The ICA as it applies to railroads and other 
industries was subsequently amended and re-codified, and the ICC was 
eventually abolished.41 However, FERC remains responsible for enforcing 
the ICA when regulating oil pipelines, under the language as it existed 
when FERC received its authority in 1977.42 
FERC’s authority under the ICA is far narrower than its NGA 
jurisdiction. For example, FERC has no power to regulate the “entry or 
exit into the oil pipeline business as it does with natural gas pipelines” and 
therefore generally lacks authority to approve or disapprove the 
construction or abandonment of an oil pipeline.43 Still, the power that 
FERC does wield under the ICA directly bears on the issue of third party 
access to oil pipelines. 
Like the NGA, the ICA requires that all rates and charges be “just and 
reasonable,”44 and the ICA also prohibits the granting of “undue” or 
“unreasonable” preferences or advantages to one party over another.45 
Similar to claims under the NGA, FERC requires a current or prospective 
shipper, in order to establish a violation of these requirements, to show: 
(1) disparate treatment, and (2) occurrence of that treatment among 
similarly situated parties.46 All rates, fares, and charges for interstate 
transportation service are filed with and approved by FERC,47 and a 
pipeline that charges a rate higher than the published tariff may face civil 
penalties,48 damages, attorneys’ fees,49 and even criminal penalties in 
some circumstances.50 
As far as third party access goes, the primary difference between the 
NGA and the ICA is that the ICA makes jurisdictional oil pipelines 
                                                                                                             
 40. William F. Demarest, Jr. & Elisabeth Meyers, Construction of New 
Midstream Infrastructure: Perils and Pitfalls of Federal Regulatory Jurisdiction, 
56 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. § 28.04 (2010). 
 41. 4 David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel, Energy Law and Transactions 
§ 85.03 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2015). 
 42. See Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(c), 92 Stat. 1337 (1979) (stating portions of the 
ICA that were repealed and codified in 1978, to the extent that they apply to the 
transportation of oil by pipeline, remain in effect as they existed on October 1, 1977). 
A copy of the ICA as it existed in 1977 is available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-
ord-reg/ica.pdf [perma.cc/EP6W-3LAB] (last visited Aug. 31, 2015). 
 43. North Dakota Pipeline Co. LLC, 147 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,121, at 61,519 (2014). 
 44. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1(5) (1988). 
 45. Id. § 3(1). 
 46. Enbridge Energy, Ltd. P’ship, 152 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,047 (2015). 
 47. 49 U.S.C. app. § 6; 18 C.F.R. §§ 341.0-14 (2015). 
 48. 49 U.S.C. app. § 6(10). 
 49. Id. § 8. 
 50. Id. § 10. 
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“common carriers.” Adopted from the English common law, the term 
“common carrier” connotes the inability of the carrier to refuse service to 
any person that pays the published fee.51 The ICA declares that all pipeline 
companies accepting interstate shipments of oil are “common carriers” and 
have the duty to “provide and furnish transportation upon reasonable 
request.”52 Thus, the “common carrier” obligation places significant limits 
on a pipeline’s ability to reject or refuse transportation service. 
What precisely constitutes a “reasonable request” is a question of fact. 
Generally, an oil pipeline subject to the ICA must provide service even to 
late coming shippers, and FERC requires some method of allocation if 
there is a request for access to a full line.53 FERC does not demand use of 
any particular allocation methodology, instead preferring to let oil 
pipelines develop their own methods of handling oversubscribed capacity. 
Traditionally, oil pipeline companies have used a pro rata approach to 
satisfy this requirement. If capacity on the line is constrained, each shipper 
receives its proportionate share of the available capacity compared to its 
share of the overall nominations.54 
FERC has approved a variety of methods for allocating capacity, 
particularly in recent years as pipelines have struggled to find ways to 
provide capacity assurance to shippers and encourage investment in new 
pipeline projects.55 As part of a new project, a company will typically 
petition FERC for a declaratory order approving its rates and prorationing 
policy in advance.56 FERC has approved the grant of firm capacity rights 
to shippers that commit to a certain level of throughput and agree to pay 
premium rates, provided that there remains some capacity open to both 
new and uncommitted shippers that can be allocated on a more traditional, 
prorationing basis.57 
However, the common carrier obligation still imposes significant 
restrictions, and an oil company’s ability to develop its own allocation 
process is not without limits. For example, FERC has indicated that any 
procedure that would allow a pipeline to transport the entire tender of one 
                                                                                                             
 51. See Christopher J. Barr, Growing Pains: FERC’s Responses to Challenges 
To The Development Of Oil Pipeline Infrastructure, 28 Energy L.J. 43, 64-65 (2007). 
 52. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1(4). 
 53. See, e.g., Belle Fourche Pipeline Co., 28 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,150 (1984). 
 54. Barr, supra note 51, at 65. 
 55. See Christopher J. Barr, Unfinished Business: FERC’s Evolving Standard 
for Capacity Rights on Oil Pipelines, 32 Energy L.J. 563 (2011). 
 56. See Express Pipeline P’ship, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,12069 (Mar. 25, 1996) 
(approving of declaratory order procedure to address non-traditional rates and 
terms of service). 
 57. See, e.g., Palmetto Products Pipe Line LLC, 151 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,090 (2015) 
(approving 90/10 split for committed shippers and uncommitted shippers, 
respectively). 
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shipper while refusing to transport any portion of another’s is “unlawful 
on its face.”58 Furthermore, the allocation procedure cannot be structured 
for the purpose of protecting the pipeline’s competitive position or 
designed to favor one type of shipper over another.59 Firm commitments 
and other non-traditional arrangements have been limited to new 
projects—such as new construction or expansion—where FERC has found 
that committed shippers are necessary to obtain financing and to ensure 
the financial viability of the project.60 
While the ICA’s common carrier obligation has significant 
implications for pipelines dealing with requests for capacity, the 
jurisdictional restrictions of the ICA limit its application on the OCS. By 
its own terms, the ICA only applies to common carriers engaged in 
transportation of oil “from one State or Territory of the United States . . . 
to any other State or Territory of the United States . . . or from one place 
in a Territory to another place in the same Territory” or to shipments to or 
through a foreign country.61 In a string of decisions beginning in the early 
1990s, FERC found that this language excluded certain OCS pipelines 
from the ICA’s purview. 
In OXY Pipeline, Inc., two pipeline owners on the OCS filed petitions 
for a declaratory order from FERC that their pipelines were not subject to 
the ICA’s jurisdiction and therefore that the companies did not have to 
adhere to the statute’s tariff filing and record-keeping requirements.62 The 
two pipelines at issue ran from wells located on the OCS off the coast of 
Louisiana to interconnects with another pipeline also located on the OCS. 
The oil was sold at the interconnect, and neither of the two companies had 
any control over the product past that point.63 The two companies argued 
that FERC lacked jurisdiction because there was no reference to the OCS 
in the ICA’s jurisdictional provisions. 
After scrutinizing OCSLA, FERC determined that the OCS should be 
treated as an “exclusive federal enclave” and that it is not an organized 
“Territory” or “State” within the meaning of the ICA.64 Therefore, FERC 
concluded that the ICA does not cover pipelines engaged in the 
                                                                                                             
 58. Belle Fourche Pipeline Co., 28 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,150, at 61,281.  
 59. Muchow & Mogel, supra note 41, at § 85.05. 
 60. See, e.g., Colonial Pipeline Co., 146 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,206 (2014) (denying a 
petition for declaratory order to approve non-traditional rate structure when not part 
of a new expansion or construction project on the grounds that a change to an existing 
system would create two classes of shippers and be unduly discriminatory). 
 61. 49 U.S.C. app. § 10501(a)(B)(2) (1988). 
 62. Oxy Pipeline, Inc., 61 F.E.R.C. 61,051 (1992). 
 63. Id. 61,226-61,227. 
 64. Id. 61,227 n.11. 
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transportation of oil “solely on or across the [OCS].”65 The same day, 
FERC also issued its opinion in Bonito Pipe Line Co.66 In that case, the 
operator of an oil pipeline located entirely on the OCS sought a declaratory 
order asserting that it was not subject to the ICA’s common carrier 
obligations. Using virtually identical language to its Oxy Pipeline 
decision, FERC determined that, like the tariff and record-keeping 
requirements, the ICA’s common carrier obligations do not extend to 
pipelines transporting oil solely on or across the OCS.67 
In both Oxy Pipeline and Bonito Pipe Line, FERC stated that the ICA 
would still apply to pipelines on the OCS if “the facilities exited the 
enclave and the oil moved in interstate commerce.”68 However, precisely 
when oil pipelines that shipped to shore would be considered as moving 
oil “in interstate commerce” remained unclear. 
FERC addressed this issue in Ultramar, Inc. v. Gaviota Terminal Co.69 
In that decision, Ultramar, a refinery in California, brought a claim against 
Gaviota Terminal Company for a refund of rates it claimed to be unlawful 
and discriminatory under the ICA. FERC dismissed the claim for lack of 
ICA jurisdiction, finding that the movement of the oil at issue was solely 
intrastate. Ultramar purchased oil from the OCS, receiving title as the oil 
exited an onshore processing facility in California. The oil was shipped 
from the OCS through a third party’s pipeline into a processing facility 
where Ultramar took title. The oil subsequently moved through Gaviota’s 
terminal system and then through two other pipelines within California 
before it reached Ultramar’s facility in Los Angeles.70 There, Ultramar 
processed the oil, and the products were shipped from the refinery into 
interstate commerce.71 
Ultramar argued that the part of the transportation it deemed 
discriminatory occurred onshore, and that FERC had indicated in Oxy 
Pipeline and Bonito Pipe Line that oil shipments moving beyond the OCS 
could be jurisdictional. Ultramar also noted that once the processed oil left 
its refinery, the motor fuels and other refined products were 
unquestionably shipped in interstate commerce.72 FERC found that the leg 
from the OCS to shore could not be considered a shipment in interstate 
commerce because the OCS was not a “State,” and, therefore, only one 
state was involved with this portion of the shipment. FERC then noted that 
                                                                                                             
 65. Id. 61,228. 
 66. Bonito Pipe Line Co., 61 F.E.R.C. 61,050 (1992). 
 67. Id. 61,221. 
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 69. Ultramar, Inc. v. Gaviota Terminal Co., 80 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,201 (1997). 
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all shipments from that point up to Ultramar’s refinery occurred solely 
within California and thus also only involved one state.73 Finally, FERC 
found that it could not base jurisdiction on the movement of the refined 
products because the processing of the oil caused a break in transportation 
and the transportation of the refined products constituted a separate 
shipment.74 
Thus, as interpreted by FERC, OCS oil pipelines are not subject to 
FERC regulation under the ICA—including those provisions governing 
capacity allocation—if the pipelines are wholly contained on the OCS, 
ship from the OCS to a single state onshore, or ship from the OCS to 
multiple states, provided there is a sufficient break in the transportation 
prior to the interstate leg. 
C. All Pipelines – The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
While the NGA and the ICA are designed to focus on the 
transportation and sale of oil and natural gas, OCSLA’s primary goals 
include the “expeditious and orderly development” of the OCS generally.75 
Thus, OCSLA is a broad statute designed to serve a variety of functions. 
OCSLA simultaneously asserts federal authority over the OCS,76 
prescribes an applicable—and sometimes mandatory—body of law for the 
OCS,77 and establishes a federal leasing program with associated rules and 
regulations for implementation thereof.78 
As part of orderly development, OCSLA is concerned with the 
“maintenance of competition” on the OCS, which in turn incentivizes 
ensuring open access to pipeline infrastructure for production.79 Section 
1334(e) of OCSLA charges the Secretary of the Interior with prescribing 
rules and regulations for all OCS pipeline right-of-ways (ROWs) and 
allows the Secretary to grant ROWs subject to certain conditions.80 To 
further the goal of orderly development and promotion of competition, 
Section 5(e) of OCSLA provides that one such condition mandates that the 
oil or gas pipelines shall transport or purchase without 
discrimination, oil or natural gas produced from submerged lands 
or outer Continental Shelf lands in the vicinity of the pipelines in 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. 61,810. 
 74. Id.  
 75. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (2014). 
 76. Id. § 1332(1). 
 77. Id. § 1333. 
 78. Id. §§ 1334, 1337. 
 79. Id. § 1332(3). 
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such proportionate amounts as the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission . . . may, after a full hearing . . . determine to be 
reasonable.81 
Similarly, Section 5(f) of OCSLA provides that every permit, license, 
easement, ROW or other grant of authority to transport oil or gas by 
pipeline on the OCS must require the pipeline be operated in accordance 
with certain “competitive principles,” including provision of “open and 
nondiscriminatory access to both owner and nonowner shippers.”82 The 
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), which is the 
principal regulatory agency under the Department of the Interior tasked 
with administering these provisions of OCSLA, has enacted regulations 
mirroring these requirements.83 
1. Early Application by FERC 
By its terms, OCSLA applies to the entire universe of both oil and gas 
pipelines on the OCS, regardless of whether such pipelines are shipping in 
interstate commerce or would constitute a gathering facility under the NGA. 
Until recently, FERC interpreted its mandate under OCSLA broadly and 
construed the statute as assigning to FERC the primary responsibility of 
enforcing its provisions. For example, FERC quickly implemented special 
licensing provisions for OCSLA pipelines, although it limited these actions to 
natural gas pipelines within its NGA jurisdiction.84 FERC indicated, however, 
that it read OCSLA to potentially extend its regulatory authority beyond the 
jurisdictional limits of the ICA and the NGA. 
FERC’s expansive interpretation of its OCSLA jurisdiction is evident in 
the OXY Pipeline and Bonito Pipe Line decisions. After first declaring that 
FERC did not have jurisdiction over a pipeline transporting oil solely on or 
across the OCS under the ICA, FERC nevertheless stated that the pipelines in 
those cases remained subject to OCSLA’s open access requirements.85 
Bonito Pipe Line is particularly enlightening on the scope of FERC’s 
perceived power at the time of the decision. The case involved a dispute 
                                                                                                             
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. § 1334(f)(1)(A). 
 83. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.1010(f) (2015) (stating that, by accepting a ROW grant, 
an applicant agrees that it will transport “without discrimination” and provide “open 
and nondiscriminatory access” to both owner and non-owner shippers). 
 84. See, e.g., Interpretation of Section 5 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 
Order No. 491, 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,006 (1988) (requiring jurisdictional natural gas lines 
on the OCS to obtain blanket transportation certificates under 18 C.F.R. Part 284 and 
suggesting that OCSLA might require pro rata allocation of capacity). 
 85. Oxy Pipeline, Inc., 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,051, at 61,228; Bonito Pipe Line Co., 
61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,050, at 61,221. 
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over an interconnect to Bonito Pipe Line’s Louisiana-adjacent OCS 
pipeline and presented the issue of whether Bonito had an obligation to 
accept undesirable shipments of crude from the Auger Unit being 
developed by Shell. Bonito’s pipeline shipped sour crude to an 
interconnect with the Ship Shoal Pipeline, partially owned by Shell Pipe 
Line. Although the Ship Shoal Pipeline accepted sour shipments from 
Bonito, the overall stream of the pipeline ran sweet after the Bonito 
shipments were commingled with sweet crude from other sources.86 A 
Shell Oil Company subsidiary requested access to the Bonito system to 
transport sour crude from the Auger Unit, which was being developed as 
a sour crude field. Bonito determined that acceptance of the additional sour 
shipments from Auger would increase the overall sulfur content of 
Bonito’s line, so it asked Ship Shoal to state in advance whether it would 
accept the increased sour stream prior to responding to Shell’s request. 
According to Bonito, Ship Shoal informed Bonito that it would not accept 
the shipments with the increased sulfur content, and Bonito likewise 
declined to transport from Auger.87 
Bonito subsequently sought a declaratory order from FERC stating 
that it was not a common carrier under the ICA and consequently was not 
required to accept shipments from Auger. Bonito further argued that its 
refusal to accept the Auger crude was justified and not unduly 
discriminatory because the Auger volumes would degrade the overall 
stream such that it was no longer a sweet line, and Ship Shoal had “flatly 
refused” to accept the Auger volumes.88 
After holding that the ICA did not apply, FERC nevertheless determined 
that OCSLA’s open and nondiscriminatory access requirements required 
Bonito to accept Shell’s shipments. First, FERC noted that the Bonito pipeline 
was and had always been a pipeline that shipped sour crude. Thus, Bonito’s 
refusal to accept sour crude from Auger, while simultaneously accepting sour 
crude from other shippers constituted discrimination.89 FERC further held 
inconsequential the fact that the Auger volumes would turn the commingled 
stream sour, because some shippers’ prior receipt of a “windfall” for the sale 
of their sour crude could not “override Bonito’s obligation to avoid 
discrimination” under OCSLA.90 Thus, FERC ordered Bonito to accept the 
interconnect. Indicative of its belief in OCSLA’s extensive power, FERC 
even suggested that OCSLA might require prorationing similar to the ICA if 
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there was insufficient capacity on the pipeline, and that it might even require 
Bonito to foot a portion of the bill for the costs of the interconnect.91 
Four years after Bonito Pipe Line, FERC issued an OCS policy 
statement making it clear that it would require all OCS pipelines to provide 
fair and unrestricted access even when neither the NGA nor the ICA 
applied.92 FERC declared that it would treat open access complaints filed 
under OCSLA seriously and that nondiscrimination under OCSLA would 
“at a minimum” require “nondiscriminatory access and nondiscrimination 
with respect to rates and terms and conditions of service.”93 
FERC flexed its OCSLA muscle again in Murphy Exploration & 
Production Co. v. Quivira Gas Co.94—this time over a natural gas 
gathering line. Murphy Exploration and Production filed a discrimination 
complaint against Quivira Gas alleging discriminatory rates for the 
transportation of natural gas on Quivira’s twelve-inch pipeline running 
from the OCS to onshore Louisiana. Though over twenty-four miles in 
total length, only 2.5 miles of the pipeline sat on the OCS,95 and FERC 
determined that the pipeline performed only a gathering function and was 
not subject to FERC jurisdiction under the NGA.96 Nevertheless, Murphy 
argued that Quivira had violated OCSLA’s open and nondiscriminatory 
access provisions set forth in Section 5. Murphy presented evidence that 
Quivira charged Murphy 38.6 cents per Mcf to transport gas, while 
charging another company only 18.5 cents for the same service.97 
FERC found that OCSLA provided it with authority to regulate the 
rates charged by Quivira, even if the facilities fell outside of its NGA 
jurisdiction. FERC also held that this OCSLA power extended to the entire 
pipeline, thereby allowing it to regulate the more than twenty miles of 
pipeline not even located on the OCS.98 Citing OCSLA, FERC therefore 
ordered Quivira to show cause and demonstrate why it had not violated 
OCSLA’s open access requirements.99 
                                                                                                             
 91. Id. 61,225. 
 92. Gas Pipeline Facilities and Services on the Outer Continental Shelf- 
Issues Related to the Commission’s Jurisdiction Under the Natural Gas Act and 
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2. Limitation of FERC’s Role 
The issue of the extent of FERC’s authority to administer OCSLA’s 
open access provisions came to a head in the early 2000s, when FERC 
issued Order 639 requiring natural gas pipelines on the OCS, including 
gathering lines, to periodically report information regarding their pricing 
and service structure.100 With looming burdensome reporting 
requirements, offshore gatherers fought back. Several companies sought 
judicial relief in Williams Companies v. FERC.101 The United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that OCSLA did not give 
FERC the authority to establish a “general open access regime”; instead, 
OCSLA assigned the Commission “narrow and specific” duties.102 The 
court examined the pertinent sections of OCSLA, Sections 5(e) and (f), 
and found that Section 5(e) merely grants FERC a single power, “to 
determine, along with the Secretary of Energy, the proportions of oil, gas, 
or other minerals that each member of any relevant group of pipelines may 
be required to transport or purchase.”103 Likewise, Section 5(f) only allows 
FERC to require pipelines seeking permits, licenses, and easements under 
other statutes administered by FERC, such as the NGA, to meet 
competitive principles104 and outlines a consultation procedure that FERC 
must follow when establishing procedures for the issuance of such 
grants.105 The D.C. Circuit held that none of these provisions granted 
FERC the sweeping authority to regulate OCS pipelines that it claimed.106 
Not to be deterred, FERC construed Williams Companies to solely 
limit its rulemaking authority and maintained that it still had the ability to 
exercise broad adjudicatory power like it had in Bonito Pipe Line and 
                                                                                                             
of charges would be inappropriate under OCSLA. Murphy Exploration & Prod. 
Co. v. Quivira Gas Co., 94 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,174 (2001). 
 100. Regulations under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Governing the 
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Murphy Exploration & Production107 This interpretation led to further 
litigation, and the D.C. Circuit once again clarified that FERC’s role on 
the OCS was limited to that of a “licensor.”108 
In Williams Gas Processing - Gulf Coast Co., FERC allowed Transco, 
a pipeline company subject to the agency’s NGA jurisdiction, to spin down 
the gathering portion of its line to an affiliate, WGP, thereby removing the 
gathering section of the pipeline from NGA jurisdiction.109 Shell Offshore 
shipped natural gas through the gathering system to Transco’s 
jurisdictional transportation line and eventually to Transco’s main pipeline 
onshore. Prior to the spin down to WGP, Transco charged Shell eight cents 
per dekatherm to move the gas from Shell’s interconnect with the 
gathering system to Transco’s main pipeline some 230 miles away. WGP 
subsequently notified Shell that it intended to charge twelve cents per 
dekatherm to move the gas 3.08 miles through the gathering system. Thus, 
once the gathering affiliate took over, Shell would have been required to 
pay twenty cents for transportation to Transco’s main line, when it 
previously only paid eight cents for the same service.110 
Shell filed a complaint with FERC, alleging that Transco and WGP were 
attempting to force gas producers to pay unjust and unreasonable rates.111 
Shell also alleged that WGP was attempting to inject anticompetitive terms 
into the agreement, such as forcing Shell to dedicate its entire reserves to WGP 
for the life of the field.112 Shell requested that FERC reassert NGA jurisdiction 
over the gathering facility.113 Other gas producers soon filed their own 
complaints against WGP alleging that WGP had violated OCSLA.114 
However, these other producers subsequently settled with WGP and 
voluntarily dismissed their complaints.115 
FERC determined that it had the power to reassert NGA jurisdiction over 
WGP because Transco and WGP had “acted in concert” and “in a manner that 
frustrate[d] the Commission’s effective regulation” of Transco, the 
jurisdictional pipeline.116 Furthermore, even though the complaints based on 
OCSLA had previously been dismissed, FERC found that WGP had violated 
                                                                                                             
 107. See Williams Gas Processing - Gulf Coast Co. L.P. v. FERC, 373 F.3d 
1335, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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 109. Id. at 1339. 
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OCSLA by “abusing” its “monopoly power.”117 On review, the D.C. Circuit 
held that FERC had incorrectly applied its own tests in reasserting jurisdiction 
under the NGA, and that it had once again exceeded its authority under 
OCSLA. The court clarified that, whether the Commission acts in a 
rulemaking or adjudicatory capacity, the text of OCSLA “unambiguously 
constrained FERC’s authority to its role as licensor” and FERC had no 
“general power to enforce OCSLA’s open access provisions.”118 
Soon after the Williams cases, FERC issued a policy statement 
acknowledging that OCSLA did not provide FERC any “general power” 
to enforce open access on the OCS and limited FERC’s authority to a “few 
well-defined tasks.”119 FERC further noted that its role as a “licensor” did 
not extend to offshore gathering facilities outside of its NGA jurisdiction 
because these facilities did not receive licenses under that Act.120 
Frustrated, perhaps understandably so, FERC’s Commission Chairman 
observed that FERC had been “repeatedly rebuffed by the courts” in its 
attempts to protect against the “monopoly power” of offshore gathering 
systems.121 The Chairman concluded that FERC would simply have to 
accept the fact that “[u]nder current law, offshore gathering is an 
unregulated monopoly.”122 With this pronouncement, FERC largely 
stepped into the background of the administration of OCSLA and its 
open access provisions, leaving room for a new regulator to take over.123 
3. Current Administration by the Department of the Interior 
The Department of the Interior interpreted the Williams opinions as 
providing it primary responsibility to enforce OCSLA’s open access 
requirements. A final rule promulgated by the Minerals Management 
Service (MMS), BSEE’s predecessor, states that the “MMS believes the 
                                                                                                             
 117. Williams Gas Proc.- Gulf Coast Co., 373 F.3d at 1341. 
 118. Id. at 1344 (internal quotations omitted). 
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[Williams] court’s decision means that the OCSLA provides the Secretary 
of the Interior the authority to issue and enforce rules to assure open and 
nondiscriminatory access to pipelines.”124 The MMS proceeded to 
promulgate comprehensive open access regulations, located at 30 C.F.R. 
§ 291.1, et seq., which are currently administered by BSEE. The 
regulations outline both an informal and formal complaint procedure for 
shippers who believe they have been denied open and nondiscriminatory 
access to an OCSLA pipeline.125 An aggrieved shipper may elect to 
informally resolve an allegation using a toll-free hotline provided and 
administered by BSEE. A shipper can choose to remain anonymous, and 
all information given to BSEE during the informal procedure is considered 
confidential to the extent permitted by law.126 BSEE’s personnel will 
investigate and mediate the dispute, as well as provide informal, non-
binding oral advice.127 An alternative dispute resolution procedure is also 
available—before or after a complaint is filed—for informal resolution of 
an allegation. 
Shippers may also file a formal complaint with the Director of BSEE, 
either before or after proceeding through the informal process.128 A 
complaint must be filed no later than two years after the alleged denial of 
access. The filing party must pay a $7,500.00 fee and serve the complaint 
on all persons named therein.129 The parties named must submit a written 
answer, and BSEE may collect additional information from the parties and 
from third parties.130 Following review of the complaint, answer, and other 
information collected during the investigation, the Director will make a 
finding of fact and conclusions of law, and will render a decision.131 If 
there is a finding that the transporter has not provided open access or has 
engaged in discriminatory behavior, the Director may enforce a number of 
remedies, including execution of an order to provide open and 
nondiscriminatory access, assessment of civil penalties, forfeiture of the 
underlying ROW, or pursuit of a civil action for a temporary restraining 
order, injunction, or other equitable remedies.132 A party adversely 
affected by the Director’s decision may appeal the decision to the Interior 
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Board of Land Appeals.133 The appeals procedure is modeled after the 
appeal process for royalty disputes, which the MMS decided would be 
“more cost-effective . . . less intrusive,” and in line with its goal of 
encouraging resolution of open access issues as opposed to FERC’s more 
formal process involving discovery, evidentiary hearings, and protective 
orders.134 
The MMS declined to provide an exemption in its open access 
regulations for lateral, feeder, and lease pipelines on the grounds that doing 
so was unnecessary: “The plain language of section 5(e) and (f) of OCSLA 
clearly states that open and nondiscriminatory access requirements apply 
only to pipelines that transport oil and gas . . . . If the function of laterals, 
feeders and gathering lines is for production purposes prior to 
transportation, these rules do not apply to those facilities.”135 Thus, for 
purposes of regulation of OCSLA open access by the Department of the 
Interior, a critical determination is whether the movement of oil or gas 
constitutes “transportation,” and no blanket exception applies based on 
how the line is named or defined by a company or a regulatory authority, 
including FERC. 
Although the MMS stated its view that OCSLA granted jurisdiction 
over all pipelines transporting production on the OCS to the MMS, its open 
access regulations do not extend to “FERC pipelines.”136 FERC pipelines 
are defined as any pipelines within FERC’s jurisdiction under the ICA or 
the NGA.137 The MMS determined that imposition of OCSLA’s open 
access requirements to pipelines subject to the NGA or the ICA would be 
unnecessarily duplicative and, thus, exercised its authority pursuant to 
OCSLA to “not to duplicate FERC compliance efforts.”138 As a result, 
determining the jurisdictional lines between FERC pipelines and OCSLA 
pipelines can be a tricky yet important legal query. 
Even more challenging, however, is determining precisely what 
actions BSEE would consider to be denials of open access under OCSLA’s 
provisions. When it promulgated open access regulations, the MMS 
declined to include express standards in the regulations, desiring instead 
to refine its definition of open access over time through resolution of actual 
complaints.139 The MMS stated only that it would use a broad 
                                                                                                             
 133. Id. § 291.114. 
 134. Open and Nondiscriminatory Movement of Oil and Gas as Required by 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 73 Fed. Reg. at 34634. 
 135. Id. at 34632. 
 136. Id. at 34634. 
 137. 30 C.F.R. § 291.101 (2015). 
 138. Open and Nondiscriminatory Movement of Oil and Gas as Required by 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 73 Fed. Reg. at 34634. 
 139. Id. at 34631. 
2016] THIRD PARTY ACCESS TO INFRASTRUCTURE  313 
 
 
 
“reasonableness standard” to resolve disputes;140 it anticipated clarification of 
this standard through application of the complaint procedure. The MMS 
estimated that it would receive approximately five formal complaints and fifty 
calls to the open access hotline the first year, followed by fewer complaints in 
subsequent years once the regulations had been applied in a series of 
decisions.141 To date, however, no reported decisions interpret these 
provisions, and BSEE’s hotline staff has revealed that there have been few, if 
any, calls to the open access hotline. Thus, while “open and nondiscriminatory 
access” is required, there is virtually no authority suggesting what BSEE 
expects in this regard in order to satisfy the mandate of OCSLA. 
In resolving disputes, BSEE could look to FERC’s prior OCSLA 
decisions or rulings made pursuant to FERC’s authority under the ICA or the 
NGA. The MMS seemed to imply as much in its rulemaking by finding that 
administration under these other statutes and OCSLA would be redundant and 
that “FERC’s anti-discriminatory compliance oversight under the NGA and 
ICA will ensure open and nondiscriminatory access to pipelines under the 
OCSLA for those pipelines subject to the NGA and ICA.”142 The comments 
of the MMS could be read to indicate that compliance with the same 
competitive standards of the NGA, and certainly the common carrier 
obligations of the ICA, would satisfy OCSLA’s requirements. Yet, the MMS 
has expressly stated that it “is not bound by, and does not intend to necessarily 
base its determinations of reasonableness” on FERC decisions.143 
The MMS further noted the differences between the statutory 
requirements of OCSLA and the NGA and ICA. For example, the NGA, 
as interpreted by FERC, requires no “undue discrimination,”144 while 
OCSLA simply states that access should be granted “without 
discrimination.”145 Accordingly, OCSLA could impose higher standards 
on transporters than that which FERC requires for compliance with the 
NGA. However, the MMS did indicate, in the final rule enacting its 
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OCSLA open access regulations, that it would take a less formal, more 
hands-off approach than that of FERC in these areas.146 
II.  ACCESS TO INFRASTRUCTURE OTHER THAN PIPELINES 
For the most part, third party access to OCS infrastructure other than 
pipelines remains unregulated in the United States. Virtually no authority 
would allow regulators to mandate access to a production platform or 
facility. Department of the Interior regulations administered by BSEE’s 
sister organization, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), 
provide for certain types of access between a party and the government, 
but do not address third party access rights, which are entirely a function 
of private agreements such as platform use agreements, production 
handling agreements,147 or other case-specific access or use arrangements.  
A. Rights-of-Use and Easements 
For example, BOEM regulations provide for issuance of rights-of-use 
and easements (RUEs). There are two types of RUEs: traditional RUEs and 
alternative use RUEs. Traditional RUEs may be issued when an entity needs 
to construct and maintain platforms, artificial islands, installations, or other 
devices at an OCS site other than the one covered by the entity’s OCS 
lease.148 The entity must use the RUE for exploration, development, 
production activities, other on- or off-lease operations, or other purposes 
approved by BOEM.149 Alternative use RUEs, which are relatively new, 
permit parties to use existing structures for energy-related or marine-related 
purposes not authorized by another statutory authority.150 The alternative 
use RUE holder may or may not be the lessee or owner of the facility. 
Traditional and alternative use RUEs provide entities the right to locate 
and use facilities on the OCS. However, the facilities themselves are private 
property. Consequently, a RUE will not be issued without permission from 
                                                                                                             
 146. See Open and Nondiscriminatory Movement of Oil and Gas as Required 
by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 73 Fed. Reg. at 34634 (stating that the 
MMS rejected the more formal complaint procedure used by FERC in order to 
avoid a “chilling effect” on complaints). 
 147. Production handling agreements often involve complex arrangements 
specific to a particular facility or project. However, both a shelf and a deepwater 
model form are available as an initial resource. See 2006 AAPL Production 
Handling Agreement (Deepwater); 2014 AAPL Production Handling Agreement 
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the owner of the facility and, if located on a leased block, from lessees as well. 
If an entity applies for a traditional RUE on a leased area, it must notify the 
lessees and give them an opportunity to comment on the application.151 An 
applicant for an alternative use RUE must reach a preliminary agreement 
regarding the alternative use with the owner of the existing OCS facility and 
the lessees of the lease on which the facility is located.152 Once BOEM has 
reviewed the application for an alternative RUE and reviewed competitive 
offerings, the lessees and owner of the facility must approve any proposal or 
an alternative use RUE will not be issued.153 
The necessity of owner approval as a prerequisite to third party access 
to OCS facilities other than pipelines is illustrated by Rooster Petroleum, 
LLC v. Fairways Offshore Exploration, Inc.154 Rooster was a co-owner of 
a federal lease covering High Island block 141 (HI 141) offshore 
Louisiana. Oil and gas production from HI 141 moved through a 
connecting pipeline to High Island block 154 (HI 154), where it was 
processed at a platform and associated facilities on the block. Fairways 
held the lease covering HI 154 and owned the platform located on the 
lease. Pursuant to a platform use agreement between Rooster and 
Fairways, Rooster was the designated operator of the HI 154 platform and 
was granted the right to access and use the platform to process production 
from both HI 141 and HI 154. Production from HI 154 ceased in August 
2011, and the HI 154 lease was scheduled to expire 180 days after 
cessation of production. Because there was still production from HI 141, 
Rooster applied to BOEM for a traditional RUE in order to preserve its 
access to the HI 154 platform to process production from HI 141. Fairways 
sent a letter to BOEM formally objecting to the RUE, citing its obligation 
to decommission the platform within one year of the lease expiration and 
the financial risk posed by delaying this process. BOEM refused approval 
of the RUE due to lack of consent from the former lessee and current 
facility owner: “BOEM’s authority to issue RUEs does not encompass the 
power to authorize Rooster to co-opt the private property of a third party 
against that party’s will.”155 Thus, as seen in this case, lessee and owner 
approval are essential for third parties seeking access to existing OCS 
platforms and production facilities in the United States. 
Rooster Petroleum also reflects a key difference as to the 
decommissioning of infrastructure between the United States, on one 
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hand, and Norway and the United Kingdom, on the other. This distinction 
extends to the decommissioning of platforms and production facilities that 
are located on an expired lease or are no longer useful for production on 
an existing lease. In Rooster Petroleum, ongoing liability risks were raised 
by the platform owner, Fairways, in its objection to Rooster’s request for 
a RUE allowing for the platform’s continued use. BSEE regulations 
requiring prompt decommissioning, as well as the concerns of owners that 
may subject themselves to additional liability and increased costs if they 
delay removal or reefing, have led to a preference for decommissioning 
over preservation in the hope that a future use for a facility may exist. 
In 2007, the MMS published a study of idle offshore facilities on the 
OCS, which determined that there were 1,227 idle structures and 2,175 
active structures in the Gulf of Mexico in 2003.156 The MMS also updated 
its decommissioning regulations, enacting the current 30 CFR Part 250, 
Subpart Q in 2002.157 Under current regulations, a lessee has one year after 
a lease terminates to remove all platforms and other facilities located on 
the lease.158 A lessee must decommission all wells, pipelines, and other 
facilities even on active leases if these facilities are no longer “useful for 
operations.”159 After conducting additional reviews in 2008, BSEE 
determined that there continued to be too many idle structures and issued 
Notice to Lessees and Operators (NTL) No. 2010-G05, which is 
commonly referred to as the “idle iron” NTL.160 This NTL sought to clarify 
Subpart Q by setting timelines for when a facility would be considered no 
longer useful. Under the NTL, all platforms that have not been used to 
support operations for five years are deemed no longer useful and must be 
decommissioned.161 
Some of the same concerns that drive these strict decommissioning 
regulations also create private incentives to do away with idle structures. 
Both BSEE and industry participants recognize that idle or dilapidated 
structures pose significant safety hazards to shipping and other industries, 
increasing the risk of an accident or well control event. The omnipresent 
threat of hurricanes further makes leaving any structures dormant in the 
Gulf of Mexico a risky endeavor. The cost to decommission a toppled or 
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damaged facility can be exponentially greater than conventional 
decommissioning costs.162 Thus, both the private and public interests in 
the Gulf of Mexico incentivize prompt decommissioning of infrastructure, 
and the United States’ regulatory structure will often mandate 
decommissioning idle structures as opposed to preserving structures and 
pipelines for future use by others. 
III.  DEEPWATER PORTS 
Deepwater ports constitute an exception to the United States’ general 
rule that a party has no right to access a third party’s offshore facilities. 
Congress enacted the Deepwater Port Act (DWPA) in 1974, which 
established a licensing system for ownership, construction, and operation 
of deepwater ports beyond the United States’ territorial seas.163 A 
deepwater port is a non-vessel fixed or floating structure used as a port for 
the transportation, storage, or handling of oil or natural gas to or from a 
state, including transportation from the OCS.164 A deepwater port includes 
all associated equipment, such as pipelines, pumping stations, mooring 
buoys, and platforms. 
This definition evolved through the enactment of two amendments. 
Initially, the DWPA only covered oil importation. Thus, only a single 
deepwater port was licensed under the original version of the DWPA: the 
Louisiana Offshore Oil Port facility. In 2002, the DWPA was amended by 
the Maritime Transportation Security Act to incorporate importation of 
natural gas. Recently, the words “or from” were added, allowing for 
exportation from a state, in addition to importation to a state. These two 
amendments may prompt an increase in applications, particularly with 
regard to the growing number of liquefied natural gas (LNG) export 
projects in the United States.  
Deepwater ports are primarily regulated through the licensing 
requirements administered by the Maritime Administration and the Coast 
Guard, with various other agencies peripherally involved in the process. 
The DWPA prohibits the issuance of a license for a deepwater port without 
the approval of adjacent states. 
A deepwater port that transports, stores, or handles oil is required to 
operate as a common carrier under the ICA.165 An oil deepwater port must 
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accept, transport, or convey without discrimination all oil delivered to the 
deepwater port, with two exceptions: the license holder is subject to 
effective competition of oil from alternative systems, and the license 
holder sets its rates and conditions of service on the basis of competition.166 
If common carrier standards are not met, the Secretary of Transportation 
shall commence a proceeding before FERC or request the Attorney 
General take appropriate steps to enforce them. The Secretary of 
Transportation may also suspend or revoke a license.167 Conversely, a 
natural gas deepwater port is not required to operate as a common carrier; 
a licensee or affiliate may exclusively utilize the entire capacity. The 
licensee may make unused capacity available to others pursuant to 
reasonable terms and conditions imposed by the licensee.168 
Nevertheless, to date, little attention has been paid to access to 
deepwater ports, most likely due in part to the limited number of such 
facilities. Currently, twenty applications for deepwater ports have been filed, 
two to import oil and eighteen to import LNG. Seven licenses have been 
issued, four of which are presently active. Of these seven, only the Louisiana 
Offshore Oil Port and the Northeast Gateway LNG facility are operational. 
However, as noted above, this situation could change as a result of the 
December 2012 amendment to the DWPA allowing exportation of LNG. As 
the interest in exporting LNG increases and more deepwater ports are 
constructed, issues may arise regarding access to those facilities. 
CONCLUSION 
Third party access on the OCS is largely dependent on the type of 
infrastructure to which access is sought. Pipelines transporting oil and gas 
are regulated by the NGA, the ICA, and OCSLA, all of which call for open 
and nondiscriminatory access for third party shippers. Yet, as a practical 
matter, there is very little guidance on what open access under OCSLA 
requires because BSEE’s regulatory scheme remains unused and untested 
since its implementation in 2008. In addition, pipelines that serve 
functions other than transportation go unregulated, and other infrastructure 
such as platforms and production facilities are not subject to open access 
regulations. For that reason, a critical part of planning new deepwater 
prospects, as well as maintaining existing production anywhere on the 
OCS, involves the give and take of negotiating private contractual 
agreements whenever it is not feasible for a party to construct its own 
facilities. 
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